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Casenote

Filtering Software in Public Libraries:
Traditional Collection Decision or
Congressionally Induced First Amendment
Violation?

In United States v. American Library Ass'n,' the United States
Supreme Court held that filtering provisions of the Children's Internet
Protection Act ("CIPA" or "Act")2 are constitutional and are a valid
exercise of Congress's spending power because they do not induce public
libraries to violate their patrons' First Amendment rights.3 The Court
also held that CIPA does not place unconstitutional conditions upon
public libraries' receipt of federal funding.4
I.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Congress provides federal assistance to public libraries for Internet
access through the E-rate program5 and the Library Services and

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

123 S. Ct. 2297 (2003).
Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 1(a)(4), 114 Stat. 2763, 2763A-335 (2000).
123 S. Ct. at 2305.
Id. at 2307.
47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(1)(B) (2000).
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Technology Act ("LSTA").' These programs allow public libraries to
provide Internet access to their patrons by authorizing discounted rates
and offering federal grants. The E-rate program, allowing qualified
libraries to purchase Internet access at a discount, was established by
the Telecommunications Act of 1996. 7 In the fiscal year ending June 30,
2002, discounts earned by public libraries through the E-rate program
totaled $58.5 million. Through the LSTA, the Institute of Museum and
Library Services awards grants to state agencies overseeing library
systems to purchase Internet access and other computer-based telecommunications technologies. Congress appropriated more than $149
million in LSTA grants in fiscal year 2002.8
Upon discovering that library patrons, including minors, were
regularly using the Internet to visit pornographic sites, Congress became
concerned that its dollars were being used to facilitate access to
pornography. Of particular concern was evidence that patrons were
viewing child pornography and that obscene material of all varieties was
being left on computer screens and printers for everyone to see. In
response to the problem, Congress enacted CIPA. The Act contains
filtering provisions that deny federal funding for Internet access to
public libraries that do not install software that blocks websites
containing images that constitute obscenity or child pornography.9 The
provisions provide, in part, that a library may not receive federal
assistance unless it has "'a policy of Internet safety for minors that
includes the operation of a technology protection measure.' "' ° However,
"'to enable access for bona fide
the Act allows libraries to disable filters
'
research or other lawful purposes."'
The American Library Association ("ALA") joined a group of libraries,
library patrons, and web site publishers in challenging the constitutionality of CIPA's filtering provisions in the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The ALA alleged that CIPA's
filtering provisions induce public libraries to violate the First Amendment rights of their patrons, and in the alternative, that the Act places
an unconstitutional condition upon the libraries' receipt of federal
assistance by requiring them to surrender their First Amendment right
to provide the public with access to constitutionally protected speech.12

6. 20 U.S.C. §§ 9121-9163 (2000).
7. Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 1(a), 110 Stat. 56 (1996).
8. 123 S. Ct. at 2301.
9. Id. at 2301-02.
10. Id. at 2302 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 9134(f)(1)(A)(i) (2000)).
11. Id. (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 9134(f)(3) (2000)).
12. Id.
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The district court found for the ALA, ruling that the filtering
provisions were facially invalid on the ground that they induced public
libraries to violate patrons' First Amendment rights. The district court
enjoined the Government from withholding federal assistance for failure
to comply with CIPA, reasoning that the Internet is a public forum
subject to strict scrutiny. Although it found that the Government has
a compelling interest in protecting minors from obscenity and preventing
the dissemination of child pornography, the district court determined
that the use of software filters is not narrowly tailored to further that
interest. 13
The Government appealed the district court's decision, and the United
States Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction. In a 6-3 decision
reversing the ruling of the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania, the Supreme Court held that the filtering
provisions of the Children's Internet Protection Act are constitutional
because they do not induce public libraries to violate their patrons' First
Amendment rights,14 and CIPA does not place unconstitutional
conditions upon public libraries' receipt of federal funding. 5
II.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

A.

CongressionalAuthority Under the Spending Clause
The Spending Clause 6 of the United States Constitution reads, in
pertinent part: "The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes,
Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the
common Defence and general Welfare of the United States." 7 Congress's authority under the Spending Clause was defined by the
Supreme Court in South Dakota v. Dole.'" In that case, the state of
South Dakota challenged the constitutionality of 23 U.S.C. § 158,"9
which directs the Secretary of Transportation to withhold a percentage
of federal funding for highways from states that allow persons under the
age of twenty-one to purchase or possess alcohol.2 ° South Dakota was
subject to the statute's withholding policy because it permitted persons
nineteen years of age or older to purchase beer that contained up to 3.2

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Id. at 2303.
Id. at 2305.
Id. at 2307.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, c. 1.
Id.
483 U.S. 203 (1987).
23 U.S.C. § 158 (2000).

20. Id.
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percent alcohol.21 The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of
the statute, affirming that Congress has broad authority to condition its
granting of federal assistance upon the recipient's compliance with
desired policy objectives. 2' However, the Court noted the existence of
certain restrictions that limit Congress's otherwise broad spending
power."
With these restrictions, courts generally give substantial
deference to the judgment of Congress, but the Court in Dole reiterated
that separate constitutional provisions may provide an independent bar
to congressional action under its spending power.24 The Court defined
this "independent constitutional bar" by announcing the proposition that
Congress may not use its spending power to induce a federal assistance
recipient to violate the constitutional rights of a third party.25 Applying this principle to the facts in Dole, the Court concluded that South
Dakota would not be violating anyone's constitutional rights by raising
its drinking age to twenty-one, thereby rendering the federal statute a
valid inducement under the Spending Clause.2 6
B.

FirstAmendment Forum Analysis

The First Amendment provides, "Congress shall make no law ...
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press .... "27 In Perry
Education Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n,2 8 the Supreme Court
affirmed that while not all public property guarantees a forum for
protected speech, the government's right to limit protected speech is
sharply circumscribed when the venue for such speech is a public
forum.2
In that case, an educators' association challenged a school
district's denial of access to the inter-school mail system when the same
system was opened to a rival union officially recognized by the district.3 ° Although it held that the inter-school mail system was not a
public forum, the Court announced that the heightened level of scrutiny
applies when speech is restricted in a public forum."' The Court stated
that the government may effectively enforce content-neutral prohibitions

21. Dole, 483 U.S. at 205.
22. Id. at 206.
23. Id. at 207-08.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 210.
26. Id. at 211.
27. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
28. 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
29. Id. at 44-45; see also Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S.
753, 761 (1995).
30. Perry, 460 U.S. at 39.
31. Id. at 45-46.
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of expression in a public forum through the imposition of reasonable
time, place, and manner restrictions, but it may regulate content in a
public forum only if it asserts a compelling interest for the restriction,
such restriction is necessary, and the
restriction is narrowly tailored to
32
serve the compelling state interest.
In Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & EducationalFund,Inc.," the
Supreme Court clarified the distinctions it drew in Perryby holding that
the level of protection granted to constitutionally protected speech on
public property is dependent upon whether the property is a "traditional"
or "designated" public forum, as opposed to a nonpublic forum. ' In
Cornelius the Combined Federal Campaign ("CFC"), a charitable fund
supported by donations from federal employees, excluded political
advocacy groups from participating as potential beneficiaries. The CFC
limited its participants to charitable organizations, thereby excluding
several pseudo-charitable outfits that were primarily advocacy groups.
A group of legal defense funds and advocacy groups challenged their
exclusion on the ground that they were denied their First Amendment
rights to solicit charitable contributions. 5 In deciding that the CFC
was not a public forum, and therefore not subject to heightened judicial
scrutiny, the Court first applied its definition from Perry stating that
traditional public fora are those which "by long tradition or by
government fiat have been devoted to assembly and debate.' 3 6 The
Court reasoned that the principal purpose of a traditional public forum
is to promote the "free exchange of ideas," while the principal purpose
of the CFC was to support charitable organizations. 7 The Court also
stated that the government must make an affirmative choice to create
a public forum to satisfy the definition of a designated public forum.3"
The Court reasoned, "The government does not create a public forum by
inaction or by permitting limited discourse, but only by intentionally
opening a nontraditional forum for public discourse." 9 Because the
CFC was designed as a forum of limited access, as opposed to general
access, the Court concluded that the government did not intend to
designate a public forum when it created the CFC.4 °

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id.
473 U.S. 788 (1985).
Id. at 800, 802.
Id. at 790-94.
Id. at 802 (quoting Perry, 460 U.S. at 45).
Id. at 800.
Id. at 802-03.
Id. at 802.
Id.
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The Court elaborated on the characteristics that constitute a
traditional public forum in InternationalSociety for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee.4' In that case, a religious organization challenged the
constitutionality of a Port Authority regulation that prohibited the
organization from soliciting donations inside an airport terminal. The
Court, holding that airport terminals are not public fora, cited its
decision in Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization' to
emphasize the importance of the historical status of the venue in
applying traditional public forum analysis."
In Hague the Court
reasoned that streets and parks are traditional public fora because "they
have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time
out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating
thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions."45
The Supreme Court held a student activities fund to be a designated
public forum in Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of University of
Virginia.46 The University of Virginia established a fund that subsidized any form of student publication unless it was based on religion.
A group of students challenged the university's regulations pertaining
to the student activities fund after the university denied authorization
of payments to outside contractors for the printing costs of their paper
because it "primarily promote[d] or manifest[ed] a particular belief in or
about a deity or an ultimate reality."47 The Court held that the fund
had created a public forum by providing state money to student groups
who desired publication, thereby encouraging "a diversity of views from
private speakers;" therefore, the university could not discriminate on the
basis of viewpoint.48
In Arkansas Educational Television Commission v. Forbes,49 the
Supreme Court held that a public television station has wide latitude in
its editorial judgments regarding the private speech it presents to its
viewers.50 In that case a group of state-owned television stations
sponsored a series of televised debates for federal senatorial and
congressional candidates from which it excluded an independent
candidate with little support. The Commission, a state agency made up

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

505 U.S. 672, 679-80 (1992).
Id. at 674-76.
307 U.S. 496 (1939).
Lee, 505 U.S. at 680.
Hague, 307 U.S. at 515.
515 U.S. 819 (1995).
Id. at 822-25.
Id. at 819, 834.
523 U.S. 666 (1998).
Id. at 672-73.
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of gubernatorial appointees, decided, in the interest of time and editorial
discretion, to limit the debates to major party candidates and independent candidates with broad support.5 ' The Court "rejected the view
LhaL Lraditional public forum status extends beyond its historic confines"
and refused to apply traditional public forum analysis in this context.5
Like the selective access to the CFC in Cornelius, the debate in Forbes
was limited to congressional candidates in that particular district.5"
Noting that the debate was not an "open-mic" format of general access,
the Court refused to recognize it as a designated public forum.54 The
Court maintained that restrictions of a nonpublic forum will be upheld
as long as those restrictions are reasonable. 5 Likewise, if governmental limitations on speech in a nonpublic forum are not based on a
speaker's viewpoint, then those limitations are not inconsistent with the
requirements of the First Amendment.56
In National Endowment for the Arts v.Finley," the Supreme Court
upheld an art-funding program that required the National Endowment
for the Arts ("NEA") to consider content when making funding decisions. 8 A group of performance artists brought suit against the NEA
after their applications for NEA grants were initially approved by an
advisory committee but subsequently rejected by the Council. The
rejections were based on an amendment to the National Foundation on
the Arts and Humanities Act, 9 which requires the NEA to ensure that
"artistic excellence and artistic merit are the criteria by which [grant]
applications are judged, taking into consideration general standards of
decency and respect for the diverse beliefs and values of the American
public."60 The Court, noting the inherent subjectivity of art appreciation, upheld the constitutionality of the NEA's decision-making process,
explaining that "[a]ny content-based considerations that may be taken
into account in the grant-making process are a consequence of the
nature of arts funding."
The Court rejected forum analysis in this

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id. at 669-71.
Id. at 678.
Id. at 680; see Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 805.
Forbes, 523 U.S. at 680.
Id. at 682.
Id.
524 U.S. 569 (1998).

58.
59.
60.
61.

Id. at 585.
Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 1(a)(4), 114 Stat. 2763, 2763A-335 (2000).
20 U.S.C. § 954(d)(1) (2000).
524 U.S. at 585.
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context and distinguished Rosenberger by recognizing that the competitive grant process must inevitably exclude some protected speech.6 2
When faced with questions regarding the nature of the Internet and
other new and rapidly advancing technologies, the Supreme Court has
been hesitant to apply the public forum doctrine.'
In Denver Area
Educational Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v. FCC,' a case
concerning the broadcast of sexually explicit programming on leased
cable access channels, Justice Breyer wrote: "[W]e are wary of the
notion that a partial analogy in one context, for which we have
developed doctrines, can compel a full range of decisions in such a new
and changing area."65 In Denver the Court agreed that protecting
children from harmful material was a compelling interest and applied
a form of heightened scrutiny while rejecting forum analysis. 66

III.

COURT'S RATIONALE

In a plurality opinion written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Supreme
Court concluded that because public libraries' use of filtering software
does not violate the First Amendment rights of their patrons, the
Children's Internet Protection Act6 v ("CIPA") does not induce the
libraries to engage in unconstitutional activities and is a valid exercise
of Congress's spending power." The Court began its analysis with the
proposition from South Dakota v. Dole 9 that Congress has wide
latitude to attach conditions to the receipt of federal funding.7"
However, the Court noted that Congress may not induce a recipient of
federal assistance "'to engage in activities that would themselves be
unconstitutional.'"71
The Court examined the traditional role of libraries in our society to
determine whether libraries would be violating their patrons' First
Amendment rights by using filtering software on their computers.7 2
Citing the American Library Association's ("ALA") Library Bill of Rights,

62.
63.
(1996);
ACLU,
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id. at 586 (citing Rosenberger, 515 U.S. 819).
See, e.g., Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 749
United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 814 (2000); Reno v.
521 U.S. 844, 849-57 (1997).
518 U.S. 727 (1996).
Id. at 749.
Id. at 755.
20 U.S.C. §§ 9121-9163 (2000).
123 S.Ct. 2297 (2003).
483 U.S. 203 (1987).
123 S. Ct. at 2303 (citing Dole, 483 U.S. at 206).
Id. (quoting Dole, 483 U.S. at 210).

72. Id.
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the Court defined public libraries' mission as "facilitating learning and
cultural enrichment."73
In accordance with their mission, public
libraries must have broad discretion in making content-based decisions
when deciding what materials to provide to their patrons."4 Rather
than striving to provide universal coverage, libraries seek to provide
materials of benefit or interest to the community that they deem to
75
possess the "requisite and appropriate quality."
The Court analogized the role of public libraries in our society to that
of the public television station in Arkansas Educational Television
Commission v. Forbes,76 in which the Court held that public forum
principles generally do not apply to a public television station's editorial
judgments regarding private speech.77 The Court also likened this case
to National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley,7" in which the Court
upheld an art-funding program requiring the National Endowment for
the Arts to use content-based considerations when making funding
decisions. 9 The Court reasoned that the same principles at work in
Forbes and Finley, in which forum analysis was not applied, also adhere
to a public library's exercise of judgment in making collection decisions.8 o The Court stated: "Just as forum analysis and heightened
judicial scrutiny are incompatible with the role of public television
stations and the role of the NEA, they are also incompatible with the
discretion that public libraries must have to fulfill their traditional
missions.""'
The Court rejected the district court's view that Internet access in
public libraries qualifies as a public forum for purposes of First
Amendment analysis.82 The Internet is not a traditional public forum,
the Court reasoned, because it is a relatively new resource that lacks the
requisite history of public communication and assembly. 3 Internet
access in public libraries also failed to satisfy the Court's definition of a
designated public forum because the Government did not "make an

73. Id.
74. Id. at 2304.
75. Id. (citing W. KATz, COLLECTION DEVELOPMENT: THE SELECTION OF MATERIALS FOR
LIBRARIES 6 (1980)).
76. 523 U.S. 666 (1998).
77. 123 S. Ct. at 2304.
78. 524 U.S. 569 (1998).
79. 123 S. Ct. at 2304.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 2304-05.
83. Id.
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affirmative choice to open up its property for use as a public forum. " '
To the contrary, the Court concluded that libraries offer Internet access
to facilitate research and learning, not to provide a public forum for the
expression and exchange of ideas.85 A library does not collect books to
provide a public forum for the authors, and because the Internet is "'no
more than a technological extension of the book stack,' 8 a library does
not8 acquire
Internet access to create a public forum for Web publish7
ers.

The Court also disagreed with the district court's contention that
filtering software differs from a library's traditional selection process
regarding its print collection."8 The district court reasoned that
because a library makes an affirmative choice as to every book in its
print collection, but does not make such choices regarding the websites
it provides, the library enjoys less discretion in providing Internet access
than it does in making book selections.8 9 The Court concluded that this
distinction was not constitutionally relevant, noting that "[a] library's
failure to make quality-based judgments about all the material it
furnishes from the Web does not somehow taint the judgments it does
make."90 Most libraries exclude pornography from their print collections, and the Court emphasized that such decisions are not subjected
to heightened judicial scrutiny.91 The Court did not see a reason to
treat
the same decisions regarding Internet pornography any different2
9

ly.

Appellees argued that the filtering software "overblocks" by erroneously blocking access to constitutionally protected speech that does not
satisfy filtering companies' category definitions, such as "pornography"
or "sex."g Without determining that overblocking would create a
constitutional problem, the Court concluded that any such difficulties are
overcome by the "ease with which patrons may have the filtering
software disabled."94 Library patrons may ask librarians to unblock a

84. Id. at 2305.
85. Id.

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 106-141, at 7 (1999)).
Id.
Id. at 2306.
Id.
Id.
Id.

92. Id.
93. Id.

94. Id.
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blocked site, and in the case of adults, disable a filter altogether "'to
enable access for bona fide research or other lawful purposes.'"95
Appellees' alternative argument, that CIPA imposes an unconstitutional condition on the receipt of federal assistance by requiring libraries to
surrender their First Amendment right to provide the public with access
to constitutionally protected speech, also failed before the Court.' The
Government argued that public libraries, as governmental entities, do
not have First Amendment rights." Without deciding that question,
the Court determined that appellees' argument would still fail on the
merits. 98 Relying on its decision in Rust v. Sullivan,99 the Court
asserted that Congress may define the limits of a program when it
appropriates funds to establish the program.'00 Because the E-rate
and Library Services and Technology Act'0 ("LSTA") programs were
designed to help libraries fulfill their traditional mission of acquiring
material of "requisite and appropriate quality," the Court held that
funds be spent for the purposes
Congress may insist that these "'public
" 1
for which they were authorized.' 02
Justice Kennedy, concurring in the judgment, asserted that a library's
inability to unblock a specific Web site or disable a filter may lead to an
as-applied challenge to CIPA's constitutionality, as opposed to the facial
Justice Breyer, also concurring in the
challenge made in this case.'
judgment, reached the same conclusions as the plurality through
different means."' Justice Breyer was persuaded that some form of
heightened judicial scrutiny should be applied here because the Act
"directly restricts the public's receipt of information."' 0 5 Justice Breyer
suggested that the Court ask "whether the harm to speech-related
interests is disproportionate in light of both the justifications and the
potential alternatives."0 ° He concluded that the Act was, in this case,
narrowly tailored and did satisfy these constitutional demands. ' 7

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id. (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 9134(f)(3) (2000); 47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(6)(D) (2000)).
Id. at 2307.
Id.
Id.
500 U.S. 173, 194 (1991).
123 S. Ct. at 2307-08.
20 U.S.C. §§ 9121-9163 (2000).
123 S. Ct. at 2308 (quoting Rust, 500 U.S. at 196).
Id. at 2310 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id. (Breyer, J., concurring).
Id. (Breyer, J., concurring).
Id. at 2311 (Breyer, J., concurring).
Id. at 2312 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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In his dissent, Justice Stevens stated that while it is not unconstitutional for a library to choose to employ filtering software on its
computers, it is unconstitutional for Congress to require a library to do
so. 108 Justice Stevens reasoned that the broad sweep of CIPA restricts
an enormous amount of valuable, protected speech that could not
possibly be reviewed by librarians, leading to the conclusion that local
lawmakers should tailor protections to address specific local problems.' °9
In addition to the overblocking of constitutionally protected speech,
Justice Stevens was concerned with the underblocking that would result
from defects in the filtering software." ° Relying on the district court's
findings of fact, Justice Stevens pointed out that image-recognition
technology is either unavailable or extremely primitive, meaning that
sexually explicit websites containing pictures, but no text, would not be
recognized by the software's search engine."'
The underblocking
would cause the statute to "provide parents with a false sense of security
without really solving the problem that motivated its enactment." 2
Justice Stevens also argued that less restrictive alternatives to CIPA
are available and sufficiently address the Government's concerns. 13
Once again relying on the district court, Justice Stevens provided several
examples of less restrictive means, including the enforcement by
libraries of Internet use policies, requirements of parental consent for
Internet use by minors,
and the removal from sight of computer monitors
114
with Internet access.
Justice Stevens asserted that the statute imposes an unconstitutional
condition on public libraries because it conditions the receipt of funding
on the restriction of the libraries' First Amendment rights." 5 He
likened the role of libraries in our society to the role of universities
because a library's functions include providing information for the
purpose of education." 6
Observing that "safeguarding academic
freedom" is a priority in our nation, Justice Stevens reasoned that a
library's collection
decisions must be entitled to First Amendment
7
protection."

108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 2313 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
at 2314 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
at 2315 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
at 2315-16 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
at 2316 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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In their dissent, Justice Souter and Justice Ginsburg agreed with
Justice Stevens and dissented on the additional ground that CIPA
induces public libraries to violate the First Amendment rights of their
patrons through the use of filtering so.tware..
Like Justice Stevens,
Justices Souter and Ginsburg were concerned with the overblocking and
underblocking that would occur as a result of the software's deficiencies,
as well as the vagueness of the statute's allowance for unblocking at the
request of library patrons." 9 However, Justices Souter and Ginsburg
did not agree that a library could constitutionally impose these
restrictions on its own, claiming that a content-based restriction on
communication that an adult would otherwise have access to amounts
to censorship. 2 '
IV.

IMPLICATIONS

The Supreme Court's decision in this case, while alleviating the
problem of harmful access to Internet pornography in public libraries,
may also work to restrict access to constitutionally protected speech on
educationally valuable websites. These restrictions could potentially
hinder the library's role in our society as a source of education and
cultural enrichment. Sites relating to history or the arts could remain
untapped resources for the library researcher operating on a computer
equipped with filtering software, as would sites discussing topics ranging
from breast cancer to homosexuality.
Filtering software, like the Internet itself, is a new technology. As it
continues to develop, it remains far from perfect in its blanket restrictions of websites that fall within its category definitions. The software
currently available for filtering relies solely on text, as opposed to image
recognition technology. This means that websites that utilize images
only will not be recognized as pornographic by a search engine, whereas
a nonpornographic website that contains one or more key words or
phrases will be blocked. Sites that are designed to avoid the reaches of
the filtering software currently on the market can do so by implementing
dummy text, or no text at all, while still featuring pornographic images.
As a result, underblocking will undermine the purpose of the Act, while
overblocking will deny library patrons access to constitutionally
protected speech.
While library patrons retain the ability to request that a site be
unblocked, or in the case of an adult, that a filter be disabled, such a

118.
119.
120.

Id. at 2318 (Ginsberg & Souter, J.J., dissenting).
Id. at 2318-19 (Ginsberg & Souter, J.J., dissenting).
Id. at 2320 (Ginsberg & Souter, J.J., dissenting).
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request could be both embarrassing and unduly burdensome. In the
course of attempting to gain access to constitutionally protected speech,
a library patron forced to make such a request suffers a sacrifice in
privacy to which this decision does not offer an alternative. Librarians
are left, in such circumstances, in the unenviable position of having to
make case-by-case determinations of what websites should be unblocked,
and for whom they should be unblocked. In addition, the statute does
not say that sites must be unblocked when a patron makes such a
request, only that they may be unblocked. Librarians will likely suffer
confusion as a result of both the ambiguity of the statute and the
subjectivity that is inherent in making case-by-case, content-based
determinations. As Justice Stevens noted in his dissent, a library patron
is also unlikely to know what sites have been blocked or hidden after
performing a search. 121 Therefore, the patron would have no realistic
way of knowing what sites to request be unblocked, and the remedy for
overblocking relied upon by the majority in its decision becomes
ineffective.
In the swiftly evolving realm of Internet law, the Court's decision in
this case could have an enormous impact. Refusing to recognize the
Internet as a public forum could pave the way for future restrictions of
speech in the form of undesirable websites. The Court analogized the
Internet to a library print collection,'2 a more sizable version of a
database of stagnant information available for both research and
pleasure. In doing so, the Court refused to recognize the Internet as
primarily a venue for the exchange of ideas akin to a park or street
corner. With the rapid development of e-mail technology, instant
messaging, and chat rooms, and the proliferation of "Internet Caf6s"
around the world, the Court's analysis is certainly subject to debate.
Although a sizable problem has been addressed by this decision,
Americans growing more and more dependent upon the Internet as a
tool for research and communication may now face other difficulties in
its aftermath.
CHRISTOPHER HARNE

121.
122.

123 S. Ct. 2297, 2315 (2003) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2304-05.

